Illicit Arms Trafficking, Corruption, and Governance in the Caribbean by Griffith, Ivelaw L.
Penn State International Law Review
Volume 15
Number 3 Dickinson Journal of International Law Article 3
5-1-1997
Illicit Arms Trafficking, Corruption, and
Governance in the Caribbean
Ivelaw L. Griffith
Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the
International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Penn State International Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact ram6023@psu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Griffith, Ivelaw L. (1997) "Illicit Arms Trafficking, Corruption, and Governance in the Caribbean," Penn State International Law
Review: Vol. 15: No. 3, Article 3.
Available at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr/vol15/iss3/3
Illicit Arms Trafficking, Corruption,
and Governance in the Caribbean
Ivelaw L. Griffith
There are four main drug or drug-related operations in the
Caribbean: production; consumption and abuse; trafficking; and
drug money laundering. These have numerous effects, including
arms trafficking, corruption, crime, and an adverse impact on
tourism, an economic mainstay of several Caribbean nations.
These operations and effects have implications for several aspects
of political, socio-economic, and security conduct in the region,
including the area of governance. This article examines some of
the connections involving arms trafficking, corruption, and
governance.
There are direct linkages among these three aspects of the
narcotics phenomenon: because of its illegality, arms trafficking
necessitates corruption; and both arms trafficking and corruption
undermine good governance. But arms trafficking is not the only
reason that corruption exists. Consequently, there is corruption in
places where there is no evidence of arms trafficking. Further,
partly because of the proscription against drug production,
consumption-abuse, trafficking, and money laundering, corruption
is a crucial facilitator of these illegalities. Because two or more of
these operations exist simultaneously in some places, corruption
often involves inter-locking networks to facilitate production,
consumption, and trafficking, money laundering and trafficking,
production, trafficking, and arms smuggling, or other such combina-
tions.
Arms Trafficking
The ownership and use of arms and ammunition are consi-
dered vital to the successful prosecution of some drug operations,
especially production and trafficking. Weapons and ammunition
are used for both symbolic and substantive purposes: for protec-
tion of drugs and drug operatives; for execution of tasks that
facilitate the pursuit of the interests of producers, dealers, or
traffickers, such as robbery and narcoterrorism; for intimidation of
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clients as well as fellow operators; and for deterrence against
deviance or disloyalty by fellow operators.
Arms trafficking in the Caribbean has been both intra-regional
and extra-regional. In the former case, it has facilitated some or all
of the above mentioned functions by Caribbean drug producers,
traffickers, and users. The disastrous consequences of the drugs-
weapons connection has been felt in Puerto Rico, St. Kitts-Nevis,
Guyana, the Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, and
elsewhere in the region. But perhaps of all places, Jamaica and
Puerto Rico provide the most startling evidence of those conse-
quences, in addition to high rates of drug-related homicides and
drug gang activities. Indeed, in Jamaica, a 1989 statement still
captures the reality today: "Jamaica over the past few years has
experienced, through an upsurge in violent crime, the effects of a
combination of drugs and money in the form of the naked display
of power, through the use of arms."1 This is certainly also true of
Puerto Rico.
In the case of extra-territorial trafficking, the Caribbean is used
to facilitate the acquisition of weapons by drugs operators based in
South America. Both intra-regional and extra-regional trafficking
have serious security consequences, manifest as well as latent
problems. But extra-regional trafficking is relatively more
dangerous, partly because of the larger quantities of weapons and
funds involved, and the notoriety and viciousness of some of the
individuals and organizations behind it. One gets a sense of this by
looking at a few of the dramatic cases.
In one case, a 10-ton shipment of arms, with an estimated
value of J$ 8 million, arrived in Jamaica on December 22, 1988 on
the way to Colombia.2 The shipment, from Heckler and Koch of
then West Germany, included 1,000 G3A3 automatic assault rifles,
250 HK21 machine guns, ten 60-millimeter commando mortars, and
600 rounds of high explosive 60-millimeter mortar shells. The
planned trafficking operation involved Germans, Englishmen,
Panamanians, Colombians, and Jamaicans. Interrogation of some
of the conspirators on January 4 and 5, 1989, revealed that the
arms were destined for a leftist insurgent group called the Revolu-
1. Vincent Tulloch, Terrorism/Drugs Combination Threatens Security,
SUNDAY GLEANER (Jamaica), Jan. 15, 1989, at 10A.
2. See Arms Shipment: Traffickers, Terrorists Involved, SUNDAY GLEANER,
Jan. 8, 1989 at 13B; and Text of Statement Made at a Press Conference at Up Park
Yesterday by Minister of National Security Errol Andersen, SUNDAY GLEANER,
Jan. 8, 1989 at 16B.
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tionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).3 The operation was
underwritten by Colombian cocaine dealers who financed FARC.
The arms had been paid for out of a special drug shipment made
earlier to Europe. The affair ended on January 6, 1989, when the
arms were placed on a Colombian military aircraft and sent to
Bogotd. The foreigners were extradited and the Jamaicans 'were
held on several charges.4
More dramatic, though, was the case involving Antigua-
Barbuda. On December 15, 1989, the Colombian police killed
Gonzalo Rodrfguez Gacha and his son Freddy, both of the
Medellin cartel.5 One of the raids made on Rodrfguez Gacha's
properties uncovered hundreds of Israeli-made' Galil rifles and
supporting ammunition. Colombia sought an explanation from
Israel. The disclosure by Israel that the weapons were part of a
larger sale to the Antigua-Barbuda government for the Antigua-
Barbuda Defense Force (ABDF) led to a Colombian diplomatic
protest to Antigua-Barbuda on April 3, 1990.6 The protest
prompted Antigua-Barbuda on April 10, 1990, to retain U.S.
attorney Lawrence Barcella to investigate the matter. This was
essentially an investigation about the international aspects of the
matter. As the matter developed, though, it was clear that both
domestic and foreign aspects had been probed. Consequently,
there was an extensive public inquiry by a one-man Commission of
Inquiry. It was held in Antigua and broadcast on local radio and
television.7
The inquiry, by British jurist Louis Blom-Cooper, uncovered
an incredible scheme involving Israelis, Antiguans, Panamanians,
and Colombians.8 Yair Klein, a retired Israeli army Colonel, and
Pinchas Schachar, a retired Brigadier-General, then a representa-
tive of Israel Military Industries (IMI), were told by Maurice
Sarfati, another Israeli, that the Antigua-Barbuda government was
interested in acquiring weapons and ammunition.9 Sarfati presen-
ted forged documents showing (a) he was an authorized Antiguan
government representative, and (b) an arms purchase had been
authorized by Vere Bird, Jr., Antigua's "National Security
3. See Arms Shipment, supra note 2.
4. Id.
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Minister," the son of then Prime Minister Vere Bird, Sr., and
Colonel Clyde Walker, then the head of the ABDF'0 Conse-
quently, the relevant End-User Certificate, the official weapons
requisition by an arms purchaser, was forwarded to Israel.1" It
should be noted that Sarfati had indeed been a government
representative at one time, but in this case the documents were
forged. Moreover, there was no person in the Antiguan govern-
ment designated as "National Security Minister."12
U.S. Senate investigations into the affair revealed that the
initial order was for 500 weapons and 200,000 rounds of ammuni-
tion, valued at U.S. $353,700.13 The final order total was U.S.
$324,205. A down payment of U.S. $95,000 was made, and
between November 14, 1988, and February 13, 1989, thirteen
financial transactions, ranging from U.S. $44,000 and U.S. $100,000
were made on the deal.14 The banks used were Banco Aleman-
Panameflo, Philadelphia International Bank, Manufacturers
Hanover Trust, Bank Hapoalim of Israel, and American Security
Bank of Washington, D.C.5 The weapons were placed aboard a
Danish ship, MV Else TH, which sailed from Haifa, Israel, on
March 29, 1989, bound for Central and South America via Antigua.
The consignment was transshipped at Port Antigua to the MV
Seapoint, a Panamanian ship. The Seapoint then took the arms to
Colombia to the real consignee, the Medellfn cartel. The
Antiguans implicated were: Vere Bird, Jr., Minister of Public
Works and Communications; Lt. Col. Clyde Walker, ABDF
Commander; Vernon Edwards, Managing Director of a shipping
and brokerage agency; and Glenton Armstrong and Sean Leitch,
Customs officers.
16
Sarfati, the leading Israeli figure, first went to Antigua in April
1983. He cultivated a friendship with Vere Bird, Jr., then an
attorney in private practice, who was instrumental in the granting
of approval for a melon cultivation project, one of Sarfati's pet
schemes. 7 The Bird-Sarfati friendship produced many advantages
10. BLOM-COOPER, supra note 5.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Arms Trafficking, Mercenaries, and Drug Cartels: Hearings before the
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and Committee on Governmental




17. BLOM-COOPER, supra note 5, at 47-52.
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for Sarfati between 1983 and 1990: appointment in October 1984
by Vere Bird, Jr., as Special Advisor on Civil Aviation; appoint-
ment in May 1985 as Special Envoy in the Ministry of External
Affairs, Economic Development, and Tourism; a 1985 OPIC ([U.S.]
Overseas Private Investment Corporation) loan of U.S. $700,000;
a supplemental loan from OPIC for U.S. $600,000 in 1986;
appointment in February 1986 as Managing Director of Antigua-
Barbuda Airways, with a token salary of U.S. $100, but a U.S.
$70,000 expense account; and a series of 1987 promissory notes by
the Antiguan government, totaling U.S. $4 million.'8
Thus, Sarfati had developed a relationship with the Antiguan
government, and with Vere Bird, Jr. in particular, enabling him to
exploit the relationship and not account meaningfully for any of his
actions. Vere Bird, Jr., also benefitted from the links. For
example, his law firm, Bird and Bird, handled the legal interests of
Sarfati's corporate holdings-Roydan Ltd. and Antigua Promoters
Ltd. In addition, Sarfati guaranteed Bird's loans, amounting to
U.S. $92,000 in November 1988.1' Blom-Cooper observed: "It
seems to me a matter of some significance that at the time the
conspiracy was negotiated, Mr. Vere Bird, Jr. was in financial
difficulties and was beholden to the bankrupt Mr. Sarfati. He
needed money, but he also needed to help Mr. Sarfati earn
money."'  The Commissioner made an even more damaging
observation: "I entertain no doubt Mr. Vere Bird, Jr. was paid by
or at least with, money emanating from Sefior Rodrfguez Gacha,
for the services rendered to the arms transhipment.
21
The arms transhipment was, however, only part of a larger
scheme, which was initiated in September 1988, to create a
mercenary training outfit using the ABDF as organizational cover.
According to the brochure produced by Spearhead Ltd., the
project's corporate entity, the aim was to establish a security school
to train "corporate security experts, ranging from the executive
level to the operational level, and bring them to the highest
professional capacity in order to confront and defuse any possible
threat."'  A central part of the enterprise was to be a "specialty
shop" to sell small arms, among other things. Blom-Cooper
asserted: "To any one with the slightest knowledge of armed forces
18. Id. at 120-21.
19. Id. at 116.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 117.
22. BLOM-COOPER, supra note 5, at 58.
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it was obvious that the training school proffered by Spearhead Ltd.,
was intended, among other things, to train mercenaries in assault
techniques and assassination."'
The full extent of arms trafficking in the Caribbean may never
be known, for fairly obvious reasons. What is clear from direct and
circumstantial evidence, though, is that the cases mentioned above
do not represent the sum total of Caribbean arms smuggling. Scott
MacDonald, for example, recounted an incident involving "Mickey"
Tolliver, an American pilot and a July 1986 air run.24 The run
began in Haiti, where he picked up a DC-3 with weapons and
ammunition. After making a stop in Costa Rica, he flew to
Colombia for a consignment of 4,000 pounds of marijuana and 400-
500 kilos of cocaine, and then headed for the Bahamas where all
the weapons and ammunition were unloaded.'
Guyana, which has risen in prominence in drug trafficking, is
also said to be deeply implicated in arms trafficking. The contra-
band goods smuggling routes linking Guyana with Brazil, Suriname,
and Venezuela that were developed during the 1970s as the country
faced an economic crisis, have been adapted to drug trafficking.
These are, no doubt, also being used to smuggle arms.26 As with
drug trafficking, Guyana is also vulnerable because of its physical
and social geography, and its political and economic weaknesses:
214, 970 km2 of territory that is sparsely populated, and then mainly
along the Atlantic coast; long borders with neighboring coun-
tries-,120 km with Brazil, 745 km with Venezuela, and 600 km
with Suriname-none of which are adequately policed, largely due




In many ways corruption is an inevitable consequence of the
illicit operations described above. It is the proscription against
drug production, trafficking and the other operations, coupled with
the demands for them that drives corruption. Drug-related
corruption in the Caribbean, like elsewhere, violates both laws and
norms. It involves acts of commission and omission that breach
23. Id.
24. SCOTT B. MACDONALD, DANCING ON A VOLCANO 111 (1988).
25. Id.
26. See generally, Gun Runnings, GUYANA REV., June 1995, at 12; and Arms
Found, and Arms Seized, GUYANA REV., Apr. 1996, at 2.
27. Arms Found, supra note 26.
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laws and deviate from accepted social, economic, and political
norms. Especially problematic are acts by public officials. Drug
corruption varies in nature, scope, and impact, but despite the
variation, the deleterious effects on governance are unmistakable.
In conceptual terms, there are different ways to approach the
subject of corruption. One approach-by Ethan Nadelmann-
which is useful for our analysis, distinguishes networks by size,
sophistication, and hierarchical structure. This approach differenti-
ates between three types-sporadic, systemic, and institutionalized
corruption. 28
The first is characterized by the absence of broad patterns of
corruption, where individuals or small groups take bribes without
sharing their takings or knowledge of their activities with other
personnel.29  Systemic corruption has two facets. In the first,
corruption is pervasive, but poorly organized; although corruption
may be rampant, not every one in the hierarchy is corrupt. In the
second, there is a hierarchical payoff arrangement where lower-
level officials hand over most of their takings to their superiors."
The flow of the takings may also flow in the reverse direc-
tion-higher to lower. Institutionalized corruption is defined as
when all "payoff cones" fall within a centralized national "payoff
cone" or where only one "payoff cone" exists for the entire
nation.31 One example of this would be where the country's
maximum leader controls virtually all corrupt schemes of any value,
especially using the military and the police.32
There is considerable evidence of sporadic and systemic
corruption in the Caribbean. Yet, except perhaps for pre-Aristide
Haiti, no contemporary Caribbean country fits Nadelmann's
category of institutionalized corruption. However, as will be seen
later, several countries have had institutionalized corruption, if such
is defined differently. One approach to institutionalized corruption
that is applicable to the contemporary Caribbean is that of Peter
Andreas: "Corruption becomes institutionalized when individuals
within an institution are complicit in the [drug] trade and the
institution acts as a shield against accountability."33





33. Peter Andreas, Profits, Poverty, and Illegality: The Logic of Drug
Corruption, NACLA REP. ON THE AMERICAs 24, 27 (Nov./Dec. 1993).
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The discussion of arms trafficking above also pointed to some
the region's corruption. In the Antigua-Barbuda case, for example,
Blom-Cooper summed up the motives quite well: "Greed, the
thirst for power, and finally, unbridled corruption., 34  The
Antigua-Barbuda case was both dramatic and dangerous. Yet,
given what one scholar called "Antigua's highly distasteful record
of corruption, maladministration, and general sleaze,"3 some
observers were not surprised that it occurred. But other, reputedly
pristine places do offer surprises sometimes. One such country is
St. Lucia. For example, this writer had an extensive interview with
Cuthbert Phillips, then that island's Police Commissioner on August
16, 1988, about Eastern Caribbean security issues. The drug
problem consumed much of our attention, and Phillips waxed
eloquent in declaiming against the drug barons and their accompli-
ces. Less than a month later, however, Phillips was dismissed for
being implicated in drug-related corruption and inefficiency in the
Royal St. Lucia Police Force. (He was later imprisoned also,
following a manslaughter conviction.)
36
Partly because of the central role of the Bahamas in both
trafficking and money laundering over the years, this archipelagic
nation has had some of the region's most notorious corruption
cases. Continuous allegations about high-level corruption involving
the Prime Minister and other government officials prompted an
official inquiry in 1983. In its 1984 report, the Commission of
Inquiry noted that widespread trafficking through the Bahamas had
adversely affected almost all strata to society.7  Several top
officials were indicted, and five government ministers either
resigned or were dismissed. The Commission noted several
questionable practices by Prime Minister Lynden Pindling, and the
fact that between 1977 and 1984, his expenditures and assets far
exceeded his official income.3" For example, his bank deposits
reflected US$ 3.5 million in excess of his salary for that period, but
34. BLOM-COOPER, supra note 5, at 131.
35. Tony Thomdike, Avarice in the Aviary, 2 CORRUPTION AND REFORM 181
(1991).
36. See IvELAw L. GRIFFITH, THE QUEST FOR SECURITY IN THE CARIBBEAN
Ch. 9 (1993).
37. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal Use of the Bahamas
for the Transshipment of Illegal Drugs Destined for the United States, Gov't of the
Bahamas, Nassau 35 (1991).
38. Id.
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there was no hard evidence of his being on the drug payroll as
alleged.39
The Commission reported being "alarmed by the extent to
which persons in the public service have been corrupted by the
illegal trade," asserting that there was corruption at both the upper
and lower levels of the police force, and within the immigration and
customs services.' It declared: "We were particularly concerned
to discover that those corrupting influences made their presence
felt at the levels of Permanent Secretary and Minister."'" Media
attention, the Commission's report, and the implementation of
some of its recommendations have led to treatment of the institu-
tionalized corruption in the Bahamas; however, sporadic corruption
exists.
In March 1992, for example, Sergeant Roger Newman of the
Bahamas Police Force was charged with possession and intent to
supply six kilos of cocaine.42 Interestingly enough, Newman
worked with the Bahamas special drug court, where he often acted
as a prosecutor.43 More recently, Chief Petty Officer Keith Baker
of the Bahamas Defense Force was one of several people convicted
on January 17, 1995, in Miami on charges of importing and
distributing three tons of marijuana." In a sting operation
conducted during the preceding investigations, Baker took a cash
bribe of US$ 25,000 to use a Bahamas Defense Force boat to
provide safe haven through the Bahamas to a Colombian ship used
for trafficking.4' However, while these two cases relate to the
police and the military, sporadic corruption also exists elsewhere.
Three months after the publication of the Bahamas inquiry
report, Chief Minister Norman Saunders and Commerce and
Development Minister Stafford Missick of the Turks and Caicos
were among several people arrested in Miami on drug related
charges.46 The March 1985 arrests followed three months of
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 35.
42. Bahamian Police Charged for Cocaine, STABROEK NEWS (Guyana), Mar.
18, 1992, at 7.
43. Id.
44. Three Guilty of Importing Marijuana, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 12, 1995, at
2B.
45. Id.
46. See Deborah Cichon, British Dependencies: The Cayman Islands and the
Turks and Caicos, in ISLANDS IN THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN 579-81
(Sandra Meditz and Dennis W. Hanratty eds., 1989); see also MACDONALD, supra
note 24, at 120-22.
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investigations by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agencies (DEA), in
cooperation with the British government, and Turks and Caicos law
enforcement agencies.47 The charges included conspiracy to
import narcotics into the United States, conspiracy to violate the
United States Travel Act, and the illegal conduct of interstate and
foreign travel to aid racketeering.
During the trial, the DEA alleged that Saunders had accepted
US$ 30,000 from undercover DEA agents to guarantee safe
stopover refueling on flights from Colombia to the United Sates.
Moreover, the prosecution showed a video tape, filmed before the
arrests, where Saunders was shown receiving US$ 20,000 from a
DEA undercover agent.49 The money was allegedly to protect
drug shipments passing through South Caicos Island, en route to
the United States.
All the defendants were convicted in July 1985 on the
conspiracy charges, although Saunders was acquitted of the more
serious charges of conspiring to import cocaine into the United
States.5 ° Missick was convicted of the additional charge of cocaine
importation. Saunders and Missick were sentenced to eight and ten
years, respectively, and each was fined US$ 50,000.51 Curiously
enough, after his release from prison, Saunders resumed his
involvement in local politics. Although he was repudiated by his
former political party, the Progressive National Party, and denied
its platform for elections, he was elected to Parliament as an
independent candidate in January 1995, winning the South Caicos
seat by a mere six votes.
52
In April 1992, Assistant Commissioner of Police Rodwell
Murray of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service went public with
an allegation he had made in 1991 to top National Security
Ministry officials: that there was a drug-trafficking cartel operating
within the police force. Drug corruption had been uncovered
before in Trinidad. 3 In 1987, for example, an inquiry led to the
suspension of 51 police officers and the eventual resignation of





52. Caribbean Data File (1996).
53. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Extent of the Problem of
Drug Abuse in Trinidad and Tobago, Gov't of Trinidad and Tobago, Parliament,
House Paper No. 2, 19-21 (1987).
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Police Commissioner Randolph Burroughs who had earlier been
indicted on bribery and other charges, but later was acquitted.54
That inquiry produced considerable evidence of the violation
of both laws and norms, and at all hierarchical levels. It noted
"[tjhere is abundant evidence of a close relationship between the
Commissioner and more than one known drug dealer," and that "it
is clear that several members of the Police Service have become
involved in many ways in illegal drug use, and in its trade, and this
unfortunate situation has existed for some years now."55  The
report also highlighted the frequency of police officers "use of
drugs, their pushing of drugs, their engagement in the growing and
reaping of marijuana, recycling of confiscated drugs for the supply
of drug dealers, the operation of protection rackets whereby major
drug dealers are assisted in or allowed to pursue their illegal trade
without let or hindrance.,
56
Because of the increasing scale of drug trafficking and
attendant problems, the seniority of the police officer making the
allegations in 1992, and the seriousness of those allegations, Prime
Minister Patrick Manning invited Scotland Yard to investigate the
situation.57 The investigation was led by Detective Superintendent
Graham Seabry (Seabry Inquiry).5 ' The Seabry inquiry did not
confirm the allegations about the existence of a drug cartel in the
police department, but it revealed the scope and extent of institu-
tionalized corruption (in the Andreas sense) there, and several
structural and functional factors that facilitated it.59
According to the investigators, "corruption in the police service
can be described as endemic," existing in many forms, including
cash or goods for favors, canteen fraud, theft from colleagues, false
claims for extra duty and mileage for travel, and bribery to protect
illegitimate enterprises from police interference, and to take action
against rival enterprises.' Blackmail was also identified, with
"clear evidence showing cash demanded not to execute warrants,
54. Id.
55. Id. at 20.
56. Id. at 21.
57. Final Report for the Government of Trinidad and Tobago on Investigations
Carried out by Officers from New Scotland Yard in Respect of Allegations made
by Rodwell Murray and Others about Corruption in the Trinidad and Tobago
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not to charge criminal offenses, not to give evidence at court, or
not to be able to locate the prosecution papers."61 The Seabry
Report also stated: "The protection of whe whe banking turfs [whe
whe being an informal banking scheme] is part of this level of
corruption, but it also includes the protection of drug dealers, their
supplies, and their supply routes. This is where the core of the
police service gets its money."62
In what is perhaps the main outline of the structural and
functional linkages of the institutionalized corruption in the
Trinidad and Tobago police force, the Seabry Report declared
Two corrupt groups were identified which stretched from the
top to the bottom of the organization. Recruits were drawn in
from the junior ranks. Such groups protected and promoted
their own members, and provided a succession plan or "career
structure" for their members. Thus, the groups are self-
perpetuating. The two groups appear to be separate entities
though the division does not appear to be absolute. The extent
of any cooperation between the two groups is not clear, but the
requirement to exist unhindered unites them. Their range of
corrupt activity is wide. Anything that makes money is in,
although protection of drug dealers and whe whe bankers forms
a prominent and regular slice of the income. Using rank to
frustrate honest police action and grant concessions is an
irregular but repeating occurrence that can generate large
bonuses. The complete make-up of such groups has not been
fully established, but the heads and principal lieutenants have
been identified.
It is not realistic to put a figure on the number of
corrupt officers. The range of corrupt activities is
large and the type of corruption varies greatly.
However, the removal of about one hundred specific
officers from the service would have a marked
effect.63
The absence of prosecutable evidence against the 100 officers
named, resistance by the police union, and inaction by the police
high command combined to thwart efforts to charge any of the
officers; although some of the officers were transferred and brought
up on administrative charges for a variety of matters."4 The
61. Id.
62. Supra note 57 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 24-25.
64. Id.
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Seabry probe also identified facilitators of corruption, titling them
the "Ten Things that Allow Corruption to Flourish": (1) the police
service being a law unto itself; (2) the idea that image must be
sustained; (3) existence of a rank and status mentality, which is
used to avoid (4) responsibility, hinder communication, (5) and
promote intense ambition; (6) lack of accountability; (7) insufficient
supervision; (8) absence of a clear policy on posting and transfers;
(9) destruction of records; (10) a break-down of disciplinary
procedures; and (11) territorial control that allows local comman-
ders to pursue of condone corruption within their jurisdiction.'
Based on the findings, the Trinidad and Tobago government
sought to introduce institutional changes, including an independent
Police Complaints Authority, the establishment of a Complaints
Division within the force, for internal review, and the creation of
five new senior positions.' The new positions- one Deputy
Commissioner and four Assistant Commissioners-were to be filled
with Scotland Yard officers.67 This decision infuriated police
officers, some of whom demonstrated outside Parliament and police
headquarters on February 5, 1993, against what they called "the
recolonization of the police force."'  The staffing plan was later
abandoned.
The Trinidad Police Commissioner has acknowledged that
corruption exists, but he challenged claims about institutionaliza-
tion, averring that the police high command had no interest in
cover-ups; for him the problem was one of sporadic corruption.69
He explained the difficulty of getting hard, credible evidence to
convict corrupt officers, something that is perhaps reflective of the
institutional dimensions of the problem.7" Another senior govern-
ment official observed that regrettably, drug corruption is not
limited to the police department.71  Moreover, because of the
corruption networks across agencies, law enforcement measures are
often seriously compromised, and sometimes frustrated.72 One
65. Id. at 25-30.
66. Deborah John, A Bid to Police the Police, DAILY EXPRESS (Trinidad and
Tobago), Feb. 2, 1993, at 1, 10.
67. Id.
68. Alviva Viarruel, Police March in Historic Protest, DAILY EXPRESS, Feb.
6, 1993, at 1, 10.
69. Interview with Trinidad Police Commissioner Jules Bernard, in Port of
Spain, Trinidad (July 8, 1994).
70. Id.
71. Interview with Lancelot Selman, Director, Strategic Services Agency,
Trinidad (July 4, 1994).
72. Id.
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critical area is witness protection. Dealing with corruption is
problematic partly because it is a politically charged issue.73 This
explains some of the difficulty in getting legislation passed. But
there is a problem beyond legislation-implementation, due to
financial and other resource limitations.
Cuban involvement in drug trafficking illustrates a hybrid
between systemic and the Andreas theory of institutionalized
corruption.74 According to Andres Oppenheimer, the participa-
tion of military officials in drug trafficking, and in the smuggling of
precious stones, ivory, and other commodities, was not done to
profit individual officers, but to satisfy economic needs of the
military in the first instance, and the economic and political
interests of Cuba overall.75 Oppenheimer notes that the military
and other institutions protected officials for some time, but turned
on them when it became politically inexpedient and administrative-
ly awkward to have their projects continue.76
In the case of Haiti, evidence of the extent of the institutiona-
lization of corruption in (pre-Aristide) Haiti was produced during
Spring 1997 when prosecutors in Miami unsealed indictments
against several former Haitian government officials (and people in
the United States) in relation to drug trafficking and corruption.
The most significant indictment was that against former Haitian
police commander, Lt. Col. Joseph Michel Franqois, who was then
based in Honduras ever since being forced into exile shortly after
the September 1994 intervention that restored Jean-Bertrand
Aristide's presidency. The evidence is that Franqois had estab-
lished his power and wealth by institutionalizing corruption in the
police forces and by networking with corrupt agencies and
individuals elsewhere in the country, as part of efforts to facilitate
the movement of cocaine from South America to the United
States.
77
Needless to say, post-Aristide Haiti is still very much a corrupt
society (as was Haiti during Aristide's two periods of rule). The
restoration of democracy there has not witnessed the elimination
73. Id.
74. See supra note 33.
75. See generally ANDRIS OPPENHEIMER, CASTRO'S FINAL HOUR (1993).
76. See generally, id., ch. 1-3.
77. David Lyons and Henri Cauvin, U.S. Alleges a Haitian Drug Link, MIAMI
HERALD, Mar. 8, 1997, at 1A, 24A. See also Michel Laguerre, National Security,
Narcotics Control, and the Haitian Military in SECURITY PROBLEMS AND POLICIES
IN THE POST-COLD WAR CARIBBEAN (Jorge Rodriguez Beruff and Humberto
Garcia Mufiiz eds., 1996).
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of drug and other corruption. Indeed, any expectation of this
would have been unreasonable given the extent of the country's
systemic and institutionalized corruption. One gets a glimpse of
post-Aristide corruption from the following report:
The Haitian constitution prohibits self-enrichment through the
use of public office (articles 241 and 242). Nevertheless, there
is rampant corruption in the judicial system, and President
Preval in 1996 began his own anti-corruption campaign that
touched in part on drug corruption. On October 1, Preval
ordered the arrest of one judge for the release of an alleged
Dominican trafficker, and released from judicial responsibilities
another judge accused of improprieties in narcotics related
cases.
78
While the above cases highlight the sporadic and the Andreas
theory of institutionalized corruption, the case of Aruba comes
closest to approximating one of the two systemic kinds identified
by Nadelmann. 9 Corruption there is reportedly so deep and wide
that the late Claire Sterling, widely acclaimed for her works on
drugs and crime, said of it: "the world's first independent mafia
state emerged in 1993. "8 She argued that Aruba was "bought
and paid for" by one of the most powerful mafia families: the
Cuntrera brothers-Paolo and Pasquale-of Italy and Venezuela.8 l
From nearby Venezuela, the Cuntreras are said to have bought
and corrupted everything of value in Aruba: casinos, hotels, real
estate, banks, police and customs officials, the prime minister, the
justice minister, and the ruling and opposition parties.' This
corrupt "purchase" allegedly was the culmination of a process that
began in October 1987 when a Sicilian-Medelifn drug summit
agreed to form a strategic alliance of the Italians and the
Colombians.8 However, the U.S. Department of State feels that
the corruption in Aruba goes beyond the Colombian-Italian
connection; ethnic Chinese are also allegedly involved.'"
Several observations are in order. First, corrupted officials not
only violate laws and norms within their own nations, sometimes
78. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 187 (Mar. 1997).
79. See supra note 28.
80. CLAIRE STERLING, THIEVES' WORLD 21 (1994).
81. Id.
82. See generally, STERLING, supra note 80.
83. Id.
84. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 364-65, 508-09 (U.S.
Dep't. of State 1995).
1997]
502 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:3
they cross international boundaries to do this. Indeed, the transna-
tional nature of most drug operations examined above makes this
inevitable. In one case, for instance, Rufus Trotman of the
Barbados mission in Caracas was dismissed in 1988 for his role in
an attempt to use the Barbadian diplomatic bag to smuggle four
pounds of cocaine out of Venezuela.' In a second case, a
Barbadian immigration officer was arrested at London's Heathrow
International Airport with a large quantity of cocaine he had
brought from Barbados. 6 In another case, Sergeant Earl Scott of
the Jamaica Constabulary Force was sentenced to seven years in
the Cayman Islands on January 6, 1994, following conviction for
possessing one pound of cocaine with intent to supply. 7 Scott and
two female companions-Judith Kerr and Coleen Williams-had
gone to the Caymans in February 1992 with the cocaine. Following
negotiations with someone who turned out to be an undercover
policeman, they agreed on a sale of the drugs."8
The second observation is that the cases discussed here do not
constitute the totality of corruption in the Caribbean. In talking
about corruption in relation to his county, for example, the Justice
Minister of Suriname, Soeshiel Girjasing, declared in 1995 that
"The drug mafia has penetrated the military and the police.., very
deeply."89 Although reluctant to specify the level of corruption,
he admitted that several army and police officials were among the
117 people arrested in 1994 for trafficking.9' In the Dominican
Republic, persistent accusations of drug-related corruption forced
President Joaquin Balaguer on November 1, 1995, to dismiss
Attorney General Juan Demostenes Cotes Morales and a prosecu-
tor attached to the Santo Domingo Appeals Court, Jose Leonardo
Duran Fajardo.91 Later that same month court martial procee-
dings began against two officers accused of cocaine smuggling: Lt.
85. GRIFFrH, supra note 36, at 256.
86. Roy Morris, Bajan Connection Arrested in London, DAILY NATION
(Barbados), May 16, 1990, at 1.
87. Jamaica Police Sergeant gets Seven Years for Cocaine, STABROEK NEWS,
July 9, 1994, at 5.
88. Id. and Drug Convict points to top DLP Members in Scandal, SUNDAY
ADVOCATE (Barbados), Oct. 2, 1994, at 1, 4.
89. Andrew Cawthorne, Cocaine Barons Threaten Suriname, STABROEK NEWS,
Mar. 8, 1995, at 1, 12.
90. Id.
91. Dominican Republic: Two Officials Dismissed in Drug-related Scandal,
MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 2, 1995, at 29A.
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Col. Luis Rivera Jimenez and First Lt. Basilio Alcantara
Gonzalez. 2
Third, while most of the sporadic and institutionalized corrup-
tion mentioned here pertain to military and law enforcement
agencies, corruption is not limited to such agencies. Official
reports, indictments, and interviews by this writer have identified
a wide variety of government agencies implicated, notably those
dealing with customs, taxes, prisons, and banking. Moreover,
although the discussion thus far has focused on violations of law
and norms by government officials, drug-related corruption is not
only a public sector phenomenon. The private sector is just as
involved: owners and operators of banks, non-banking financial
enterprises, taxi companies, airlines, shipping companies, supermar-
kets, farms, warehouses, private security agencies, and other
businesses are also corrupted. Moreover, private sector corruption
is also actually and potentially injurious to moral rectitude and
good governance.
Finally, although most of the corruption cases cited here
identify officials in the executive branch of countries, the judicial
and legislative branches are not exempt from corruption. Corrup-
tion networks extend not just across agencies in a single branch of
government, but also across branches. In Puerto Rico, there were
serious charges of corruption during 1994 and 1995 in both
legislative chambers.93 In one instance the Senate reacted to
accusations against four Senators by ordering Senators to undergo
drug tests, and one Senator even invited reporters into a public
bathroom to vouch for the integrity of the urine sample94 (The
reporters accepted the invitation.).
Governance at Risk
Undoubtedly, drug-related (and other) corruption have conse-
quences for the observance of laws and norms. Apart from leading
to the erosion of respect for law and norms, they also affect the
shaping of attitudes and values in societies that are already vulnera-
ble to cultural penetration and the political machinations of state
and non-state actors elsewhere. Thus, Anthony Maingot was both
coy and correct in observing that "The corrupting power of the
92. Caribbean Date File (1996).
93. Mireya Navarro, Puerto Rico Reeling Under Scourge of Drugs and Rising
Gang Violence, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1995, at All.
94. Id.
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drug trade does strange things to an otherwise decent people."
95
Some of the "strange things" happen at the individual level,
but-and this is worse-many of them happen at the group,
national, and international levels as well, affecting governance
within the Caribbean people. The governance implications are
both military and political in nature.96
In the military area, the corruption of military and police
officials compromises these agents of national security, with the
effect that (a) their capacity for effective action is undermined, and
(b) individuals and groups become inclined to resort to vigilante
tactics because of that diminished capacity or a perception of it.
Vigilante operations have long existed in Haiti and Jamaica.
However, they are spreading to other places, to the point where
National Security Minister Russell Huggins of Trinidad and Tobago
was forced to make a national radio and television broadcast on the
subject in June 1993.9' Among other things, he declared: "I wish
to state quite strongly that under no condition will the government
condone the formation of vigilante groups [where people] may
choose themselves to be unlawfully armed with dangerous weapons
on the pretext of protecting the community. '"98
The situation is worse when soldiers and policemen facilitate
arms trafficking, as has been the case in Antigua-Barbuda, the
Dominican Republic, Guyana, Jamaica and elsewhere. Arms
trafficking presents real prospects for augmenting the store of
illegal weapons with Caribbean countries, since, as with drugs, some
of what is trafficked stays in the region, both by default and by
design. This serves both to aggravate the crime problem and
enable drug gangs to engage in violent conflict or escalate the level
of existing violence. Jamaica, Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Tobago,
the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and St. Kitts-Nevis are among
places that bear sad testimony to this.99
The undermining of effectiveness mentioned above is partly a
function of a loss of public confidence, either in the government as
a whole, or in certain specific institutions, and both of these have
political implications. The October-November 1994 St. Kitts-Nevis
95. Anthony P. Maingot, Laundering the Gains of the Drug Trade: Miami and
Caribbean Tax Havens, 30 J. INTERAMER. STUD. & WORLD AFF. 173 (1988).
96. See generally, IvELAw GRIFFITH AND TREVOR MUNROE, DRUGS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CARIBBEAN: SOVEREIGNTY UNDER SIEGE (1987).
97. Crackdown on Vigilantes, N.Y. CARIB. NEWS, June 23, 1993, at 8.
98. ld.
99. See generally BLOM-COOPER, supra note 5; GRIFFITH, supra note 96.
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drugs-weapons-murder-riot saga, which led to the ouster of the
ruling party in July 1995 elections, reflects the former." ° Perhaps
more than anywhere else, recently in the Caribbean, the St. Kitts-
Nevis experience dramatizes the emerging and dangerous linkages
involving politics, power, and drugs, and the crime and other
challenges to governability which these precipitate.)10 Particularly
since 1993, people in the leadership of the People's Action
Movement (PAM), which ruled the country between February 1980
and July 1995, and of the St. Kitts Labor Party (SKLP), which won
power in July 1995, have been credibly connected to people
involved in the drug trade.' °
In relation to the PAM government, during the 1980s the
ambassador to the United Nations, William Herbert, had been
implicated in money laundering and drug trafficking."° In July
1994 Herbert and his family disappeared mysteriously at sea.
There was strong suspicion of foul play related to drugs."° On
October 1, 1994, Vincent Morris, one of the sons of Deputy Prime
Minister Sidney Morris disappeared along with his fiancee, Joan
Walsh. l"5  Later, they were both found murdered-in the trunk
of a burnt vehicle abandoned in a cane field." The next month,
two other sons of the Deputy Prime Minister were arrested for
trafficking 121 pounds of cocaine and possessing illegal wea-
pons.1" They were also implicated in the murders. Meanwhile,
on October 13, Supt. Jude Matthews, head of Special Branch-the
agency that protects top government officials-and the chief
investigator into the murders, was himself assassinated on the way
to work."
The Morris brothers were granted bail after arraignment1 °9
A public protest and a prison riot ensued as a result of the
perception by the public and prisoners that the family and political
connections of the Morris brothers influenced the granting of bail
to them, manifestly violating equal treatment norms.110 Sidney
100. See generally, IvELAw L. GRIFFITH & TREVOR MUNROE, HUMAN RIGHTS
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Morris was forced to resign as Deputy Prime Minister.111 The
riot resulted in the complete destruction of the central prison and
the escape of over 150 prisoners, necessitating the invitation of
troops from the Regional Security System (RSS) to help restore
order (Most of the prisoners were recaptured later.).112
Given the erosion of public confidence, the PAM government
was forced to concede to a call by the opposition SKLP and a
coalition of civic groups for new elections within a year.' The
elections were held on July 3, 1995-three years before the
government's term of office was due to end.' The opposition
SKLP was victorious, winning almost 50 percent of the popular
vote, and seven of the eleven elected legislative seats."5 Predic-
tably, major issues in the elections campaign were the escalation of
narco-crime, drug-related violence in the country, and the perceived
complicity of government officials in drug trafficking."
6
At the same time, the leadership of the SKLP, which formed
the new government, was not without its own "skeletons in the
closet.""' 7 In May 1993, for instance, just six months before the
controversial November 1993 general elections, Noel "Zamba"
Heath, a long standing business partner of both Dr. Denzil Douglas
and Sam Condor, SKLP leader and deputy leader, respectively, was
arrested and charged with illegal possession of drugs and ammuni-
tion."' Heath subsequently pleaded guilty to the illegal weapons
charges and was fined." 9 Hence, in the St. Kitts-Nevis situation
the narcotics stain tarnishes the credibility of the country's
leadership and contributes to the erosion of confidence in the
political elites. All this clearly hurts good governance and
sovereignty.12°
' Thus, among other things, drug corruption has two serious
consequences: its undermines the credibility of governments; and,
as the St. Kitts-Nevis case clearly shows, it impairs the ability of
government agencies to protect the interests of the state, both
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and bureaucrats to adequately define those interests. When one
bears in mind the political and social penetrability of Caribbean
societies it is relatively easy to understand how the governability
and sovereignty of states there can be subverted by drug barons
and their accomplices. Sir Shridath Ramphal, former Common-
wealth Secretary-General, highlighted both political and military
vulnerability involved in stating: "It only takes twelve men in a
boat to put some of these governments out of business.,
121
Military-political dangers were similarly implicit in a remark by one
Caribbean diplomat: "A handful of well-armed narcotic soldiers or
mercenaries could make a lightning trip to a country, wreak
destruction, and fly out before a defense could be mounted by
states friendly to the small island."'"
Conclusion
This article suggests that narcotics arms trafficking and corrup-
tion present a clear and present danger for the Caribbean. The
dangers of drugs are matched by the uniqueness of the enterprise.
Nadelmann captures this uniqueness when he says: "No other
criminal activity comes close in terms of its magnitude, its lucrative-
ness, its capacity to corrupt the previously uncorruptible, its
political consequences, and its impact on international rela-
tions."'" This statement holds true for the Caribbean as it does
for other regions.
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